- China's military capabilities are increasing.

Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan will be the most complex military operation we've ever seen in history.

More complex than the Normandy invasions.

(upbeat music) - Hello, and welcome to "GZERO World".

I'm Ian Bremmer.

And today, we are asking a question keeping diplomats, military experts, and policy makers all over the world up at night.

Could China and Taiwan be heading toward war?

Tensions are high.

The People's Liberation Army has been carrying out larger and more frequent military drills around Taiwan, making the possibility of invasion feel closer than ever before.

Diplomatic red lines are being tested and the risk of miscalculation is rising.

Securing Taiwan is crucial for global stability.

The island manufacturers over 90% of the world's most advanced semiconductors, and nearly half of all container ships pass through the Taiwan Strait.

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would upend the global economy, reshape alliances, and likely trigger the most deadly conflict in the Asia Pacific since World War II.

So, how close are we to armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait?

What are China's goals and how far is Beijing willing to go to achieve them?

And crucially, if China did attack Taiwan, would the Trump administration step in to help defend it?

I'm sitting down with Bonnie Lin, she's director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Don't worry, I've also got your Puppet Regime.

- Okay, welcome back to "This Authoritarian Life", a podcast hosted by me and President Xi.

- But first, a word from the folks who help us keep the lights on.

- [Narrator] Funding for "GZERO World" is provided by our lead sponsor, Prologis.

- [Narrator] Every day, all over the world, Prologis helps businesses of all sizes lower their carbon footprint, and scale their supply chains with a portfolio of logistics and real estate and an end-to-end solutions platform, addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today.

Learn more at prologis.com.

- [Narrator] And by Cox Enterprises is proud to support GZERO.

Cox is working to create an impact in areas like sustainable agriculture, clean tech, healthcare, and more.

Cox, a family of businesses.

Additional funding provided by Jerre and Mary Joy Stead, Carnegie Corporation of New York, and... (upbeat music) (screen swooshing) (gentle upbeat music) - If you imagine conflict in the Taiwan Strait, it probably looks like something out of Call of Duty.

Missiles raining over Taipei, Chinese Marines storming beaches, warships clash at sea.

Basically, World War II.

If you've been paying attention to the news, you can't avoid talk of a conflict.

The Chinese President Xi Jinping has made reunification with Taiwan a major policy focus and a key pillar of his nationalist agenda.

(President Xi Jinping speaking in Chinese) - Xi has ordered the People's Liberation Army to be ready to seize Taiwan by 2027.

That's soon.

And the PLA has been conducting near daily military drills around the island of late, making policymakers and military analysts pretty nervous.

China at least, is showing that they want to be prepared for an invasion.

But is a war with Taiwan in Beijing's interest?

It would be deadly, it'd be costly, likely to drag in the United States and its allies.

No bueno.

Instead, could China take Taiwan without firing a single shot?

Think about the geography.

Taiwan is an island with few natural resources.

They import 97% of its energy, 70% of its food, and they rely on undersea cables for their internet.

They've got five months of oil, a month of coal, maybe a year of food in reserves.

Taiwan also relies heavily on exports like microchips, which make up about 70% of its GDP.

Interrupting Taiwan's trade, and it wouldn't just hurt its economy, it would threaten its survival.

Even a 50% drop would cripple the island.

That's where a quarantine comes in.

China could manufacture some minor security incident in the Strait and announce new safety inspections for all ships entering and exiting.

They could deploy the Coast Guard, technically a civilian law enforcement body, not the military, to inspect cargo and turn away tankers.

Nothing overtly military like customs with Chinese characteristics.

This tactic is what is called a gray zone.

It's warfare action that stays just below a threshold that would trigger an international response.

You can see why it's ideal for Beijing.

No missiles, no tanks, just a slow suffocating squeeze.

And China wouldn't have to stop there.

Cyber attacks could knock out Taiwan's power grid, banking system.

Disinformation would flood the Taiwanese internet and undermine government trust.

If Taiwan responds with force, China can claim it was provoked and escalate.

Add to all this uncertainty, the US response.

The Taiwan Relations Act says that Washington will help Taiwan defend itself.

And it considers coercion, including blockades, a threat to peace.

But would a United States president really risk war with a nuclear armed China over what Beijing claims are legal maritime safety inspections.

For decades, the US has adhered to a policy known as strategic ambiguity.

Refusing to say whether it would indeed use military force to help defend Taiwan, if China invaded.

That ambiguity has worked so far, but it leaves Taipei open to exactly the sort of non-military pressure that Beijing prefers.

It's a slow, steady erosion of Taiwanese autonomy and it leaves the world wondering, how far can China push?

How long can Taiwan hold out before a crisis is inevitable?

To help make sense of all this, I'm joined by Bonnie Lin, she's director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Bonnie Lin, welcome to "GZERO World".

- Thank you.

Thank you for the invite, Ian.

Really great to be here with you.

- Lots to talk about.

You've said that the risk of war with Taiwan is getting higher.

Explain for our viewers just a little context of what you mean by that.

- Sure.

So, as a baseline, I don't think there's a high risk of war right now in the Taiwan Strait.

I think right now it's low or medium, but we are seeing more Chinese military preparations for war.

We're seeing more antagonism from Beijing against the current Taiwan president, William Lai.

And there's a lot more suspicion that he will, that William Lai will do more to push for Taiwan independence.

There's been a lot of talk in DC about 2027, about how that that's a date for when China will have military capabilities to invade Taiwan.

That's definitely still there.

That's still on Xi Jinping's mind.

There's been no change in terms of Xi instructing his military to have the capabilities.

But I think what worries my team also about 2027 is the end of 2027 is also the elections for William Lai as he goes into his second term.

So, China's worried that Lai will be much more provocative in 2027.

- Tell me what it feels like to be in Taiwan in this period of great geopolitical instability right now.

How much is that reality pervasive in everyday life for just a Taiwanese citizen?

- I guess I would say right now, I mean your everyday Taiwan citizen goes about his or her own life normally, right?

There's probably more worry about what's happening on the tariff side than what we, at least in DC, would view as the near daily PLA threat against Taiwan.

I don't think most Taiwan folks are worried about that on a day-to-day basis.

- President Trump has come out and he said that TSMC, the global semiconductor company is ripping Americans off.

He has said that the Taiwanese don't spend enough money on defense.

Is there a broader concern about is America really there for us?

- As with type of dealing with any new US administration, it's trying to understand what is the US policy towards Taiwan.

There's also a desire to understand who will be driving that Taiwan policy, whether that's at the National Security Council, State Department, or Department of Defense.

I think what I would say right now is Taiwan's current president, William Lai, has made it pretty clear in a variety of speeches as well as policy announcements that Taiwan recognizes that on the defense side, need to do more on its defense.

He set a floor of 3% of of GDP spending for defense.

He also recognizes that economic issue is very central to President Trump.

So, he has called for more, he's established most recently a sovereign wealth fund for Taiwan businesses to be able to invest more abroad, including investing in the United States.

And he's also noted that Taiwan as a democracy will work with the United States and other democracies to try to construct a non-red supply chain.

- Now, China itself, of course, has an economy that's only growing.

The asymmetry in power between China and Taiwan is even greater than between India and Pakistan.

It's even greater than between Israel and Iran.

It's greater than between Russia and Ukraine.

So, I mean, in a world where there's less global governance, in a world where there's more law of the jungle, this doesn't go well for Taiwan.

- [Bonnie] It do not.

- You don't have leverage.

So, absent leverage, what can Taiwan do?

What should Taiwan do to help ensure that they continue to have the political future that they want?

- So, what Taiwan is doing right now is making sure that it has very strong relationships with the United States, with other democracies in the region.

William Lai is also trying to beef up Taiwan's defense throughout, both in terms of preventing Chinese infiltration, trying to increase Taiwan's defense spending.

He's also trying to make sure that as Taiwan, particularly given the size of Taiwan's economy compared to China, that Taiwan is not as economically dependent on China as before.

- When we see the Chinese government engaging in more military exercises, live fire exercises, all the way around Taiwan.

- Yeah.

- In Taiwanese airspace, Taiwanese waters, all of these things.

- [Bonnie] Right.

- What's the reaction of the government to that?

- [Bonnie] Yeah.

- What's the reaction of the president and of the opposition?

- So, in terms of Chinese exercises around Taiwan, so there's these large-scale exercises that China's been doing, has been increasing the rate of, so since President Lai has been in power, so since January, 2024, we've seen three large named Chinese exercises and a lot more smaller, not named and not announced Chinese military exercises.

In terms of daily operations, we see Chinese aircraft and military vessels coming into Taiwan's self-identify air defense zone on a daily basis.

And about once every two weeks or so, we see an elevated intrusion of both China's aircraft coordinated with China's vessels.

So, lots and lots of activity.

- Compared to like a year ago.

- Yes.

- Dramatically more.

- Dramatically more.

So, in 2021, when China engaged in its large-scale summer exercises opposite of Taiwan involved one brigade of Chinese forces.

2022, it was six brigades.

2024, it became 42 brigades, of which over 100 Chinese naval vessels and 2/3 of China's amphibious fleet.

So, the scale went from one to 42, between 2021 to 2024.

- 2/3 China's amphibious fleet.

- Yes.

- Involved in a single set of exercises around Taiwan.

- Yes.

And I think sometimes those figures are lost, because we constantly hear about these Chinese military activities, but the rate and pace of Chinese activities around Taiwan has been increasing quite a bit.

- As has their military spent.

- Yes, yes.

I would also note that this year there has been some alarming military developments that we've seen.

So, we saw China showcase two mobile bridges that would basically allow China not only to leverage the people's liberation Army Navy, but also as you know, China leads in shipbuilding.

So, they have lots of large container ships, lots of cargo ships, lots of roll-on/roll-off ferries.

So, these two mobile bridges will allow China to use its commercial ships to bring heavy assets onto Taiwan.

We also saw this year.

- So, it's preparing for a potential amphibious assault.

They want everyone to know they can do that.

- That's right.

China is also constructing a very massive, large underground facility near Beijing.

This was recently revealed in some of the news articles this year too.

So, lots and lots of developments that are showcasing that China's very dead serious about using military force, if they need to.

- Hong Kong, of course, had an autonomous political system.

They don't anymore.

- Right.

- What makes Taiwan different, if anything?

- Within Taiwan, I think a major difference is that Hong Kong never had its own separate military.

Taiwan has its own separate military.

And also, the difference is Hong Kong is connected to mainland China by land.

Whereas within Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait creates a separation to the extent that regardless of how capable you assess the Chinese military, most would say that a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan will be the most complex military operation we've ever seen in history.

More complex than the Normandy evasion, right?

So, there's a sense within Taiwan that, yes, China's military capabilities are increasing, China's economic powers increasing.

There's a whole range of levers that Beijing could use against Taiwan, but they have the advantage of the defense.

And if Taiwan can invest enough to build up its capabilities and have US allies and partners come to Taiwan's defense, Taiwan should be able to either deter China from engaging those operations to begin with or make such an operation sufficiently complex and uncertain that even China can't be confident that it can be successful in amphibious invasion.

- The Chinese government has long said that the integration of Taiwan into the PRC is not only a priority, but an inevitability.

- That's right.

- I understand that the Taiwanese government doesn't accept that, but is there a growing fear, even a growing realization that even if you don't accept it, that that's the future that is in store?

- I don't think folks within Taiwan believe it's inevitable.

Even within Washington DC I don't think we believe it's inevitable, mainly because how complex the operation is.

I think we also forget that, if China were to invade Taiwan, there will be tremendous economic consequences that China would have to bear.

What I often hear from the people in Taipei is the people who make up the Chinese People Liberation Army, many of them are men that many of them are only children, right?

So, it would be a significant loss to China, if it were to engaged in such an operation, because of how deadly it would be on its population.

And China has been looking quite a bit at what its lessons learned from Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

And if China were to invade Taiwan, Beijing expecting massive sanctions to the extent maybe even more than what we've levied against Russia.

And so, the entire operation is not just a military calculation, but will have significant economic and financial consequences too.

- Short of invasion, what do you believe the Chinese are trying to accomplish?

- So, I think the ultimate Chinese goal is first, to prevent independence, and then if and when possible, and definitely before 2049, basically, the centennial anniversary of the, yeah.

- Of the CCP.

- Of the founding of China to have unification.

But there's actually, quite a bit of debate in China.

What actually, is unification and what are the conditions that could be offered to Taiwan as part of unification?

I think now given all what all Beijing saw with the opposition within Hong Kong, the protest, there's probably less of a desire to allow Taiwan to have its own military.

But there should be some recognition, at least among Taipei, that Taiwan is part of China.

So, I think if China were to really move forward on unification, we would actually, if short of invasion, right?

We could see a variety of formulations in which you could see a leadership in Beijing saying, "Well, that isn't exactly the way we control Hong Kong or some of the other special zones or provinces within Beijing, but that could satisfy our criteria for unification."

But below an invasion threshold, China has other options for unification with Taiwan, a blockade,- - For example.

- As a very possible operation.

- Inspect ships, for example, coming in.

- So, there's also the option of China using its Coast Guard, which is generally, viewed by the outside world as a law enforcement asset, but it's really an extension of the People's Liberation Army.

As you know, a blockade is viewed as an act of war, whereas a quarantine, a custom inspection is not viewed as an act of war.

There are lots of different ways that China could force Taiwan or put more pressure on Taiwan short of an invasion.

- Do you see a potential future Taiwanese government under domestic political pressure that would say, "Okay, we're willing to talk about what reunification might mean short of we give up all of our rights."

Do you think that's possible?

- Not until Taiwan's been under duress for quite some time.

The public opinion polls in Taiwan show more and more Taiwan population either satisfied with the status quo or against unification.

And that's been a trend that we've seen for decades.

I think where Beijing falls short is Beijing's efforts to reach out towards the Taiwan public, Beijing's efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwan public, that they are falling way short on that.

So yes, they have the capabilities, but they're not getting any of the love from the Taiwan people.

In fact, they're pushing the Taiwan people away from them more and more.

- Now, the US relationship with China famously is absent trust right now, and that's not a new development, but it gets better and worse.

Is a better relationship between the US and China good or bad for Taiwan, and why?

- I think when the United States has a really good relationship with China, there are probably concerns in Taipei that Washington may not be willing to support Taiwan as much, because of the really good relationship with China.

There's also a sense that, if China has a really good relationship with Washington, that maybe China's less worried about Washington supporting Taiwan, so maybe China doesn't need to put as much pressure on Taiwan.

So, it really comes down to what exactly, like where these two balances are.

- Because there are these two tendencies in the Trump administration, right?

On the one hand you say, okay, we like, we don't trust China, we need to spend more on the military.

Like we really want to contain these guys.

They're the threat to us.

On the other hand, you have this tendency of, we don't want wars.

Not our problem.

Europe, you take care of Ukraine.

Taiwan, you take care of yourself.

Which of those two is more present in Taiwanese thinking about Washington right now?

Which do you worry about more?

Which do you think is more important?

- So, I think Taiwan, Taipei definitely hopes the first category is more dominant.

- But do you believe that?

- At the end of the day, when it comes to the defense of Taiwan, the responsibility and decision will be made by President Trump.

And it seems pretty clear to me that President Trump does not want, does not like wars.

Has prided himself in stopping wars and avoiding wars.

But at the same time, even during the first Trump administration, we saw that President Trump was always friendly with authoritarian governments, while his team was very hawkish against them.

So, in some ways, he plays a good cop when it comes to dealing with these authoritarian governments.

And I think that's something that Taipei does recognize that at the end of the day despite what President Trump might be saying about China, might be saying about Xi Jinping as his friend, the United States is set on competition with China.

- Now, does Taipei, do they really like it when a whole bunch of senior leaders, you know, come over, engage with them?

Or would they rather stay off the headlines, because they know that antagonizes mainland China?

- So, under President Tsai Ing-wen, there was somewhat of a balance between them in the sense that there was a recognition that when then Speaker Pelosi went to Taiwan in 2022.

- [Ian] Caused trouble.

- Yeah, it caused China to engage in this massive exercise.

And then afterwards, almost every year we've seen a massive Chinese military exercise around Taiwan.

- So, arguably you would've been better off in Taiwan, if she had never gone?

- I'm not trying to say that, because her setting foot on Taiwan showcase US support for Taiwan.

But I think what the sentiment has been since 2022 is, to be honest, regardless, within Taipei, it is my understanding, particularly among the DPP, is that regardless of what Taipei does and what the United States does, China will always find excuses to escalate more against Taiwan.

So, even if you have a congressional delegation or if you don't have them, I think there's more of an assessment in Taipei as well as in DC, particularly under the Trump administration too, that China will just keep on finding these excuses to escalate.

- Bonnie Lin, thanks so much for joining us.

- Thank you so much, Ian.

(gentle techno music) - And now, we turn from Taiwan to President Xi's other side project.

It's time for another episode of our favorite authoritarian podcast.

I've got your Puppet Regime.

- Okay.

Welcome back to "This Authoritarian Life", a podcast hosted by me and President Xi.

This week, I want to start by expressing sincere admiration for Democratic Party.

- Okay, Boomer.

- Well, I have been listening to the new Jake Tapper book.

- Oh, audio books too, huh?

- Well, you know, some of us actually read rather than just lurking on TikTok all day.

- Okay, okay, okay.

Go on.

- Anyway, this Biden thing, I'm just so impressed.

I mean, look, on one hand, we have all concealed health problems of aging leaders, right?

We did it in Soviet Union, you did it with Mao.

- The Americans even did it with FDR.

- Exactly.

But anyway, here is big difference.

You never ever saw Brezhnev or FDR just like fall off a horse on television.

- You never saw Mao wandering around looking for ice cream.

- Never.

But these guys, they had Biden out here every freaking day, falling down, confused, stumbling, looking like melted gelato in suit and tie.

And they were just like, "Sorry.

Believing of on ice no longer permitted, - Completely dystopian.

- Completely.

I love it.

It was like something Orwell would steal from Zamyatin.

- Who?

- Oh, those guys aren't on your book talk, huh?

- Listen, all I know is my staff better never let me fall down in public.

- Bro, if I ever fall off a bike, somebody is falling out a window.

- Those are facts.

And you're gonna get to that age before long, Mr. Audiobooks.

- Ha, you and me both.

Anyway, game recognize game.

Shout out to DNC for pulling off a real life.

- [Narrator] Puppet Regime!

- That's our show this week.

Come back next week, and if you like what you've seen, or even if you don't, but you're planning your own show for us in the Taiwan Strait, we've got you covered.

Come check us out at gzeromedia.com.

(upbeat music) (upbeat music continues) (upbeat music continues) (bright music) - [Narrator] Funding for "GZERO World" is provided by our lead sponsor, Prologis.

- [Narrator] Every day all over the world, Prologis helps businesses of all sizes lower their carbon footprint, and scale their supply chains with a portfolio of logistics in real estate and an end-to-end solutions platform, addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today.

Learn more at prologis.com.

- [Narrator] And by Cox Enterprises is proud to support GZERO.

Cox is working to create an impact in areas like sustainable agriculture, clean tech, healthcare, and more.

Cox, a family of businesses.

Additional funding provided by Jerre and Mary Joy Stead, Carnegie Corporation of New York, and... (gentle upbeat music) (upbeat music)